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Freedman: Lawyer-Client Confidentiality: Rethinking the Trilemma

LAWYER-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY:
RETHINKING THE TRILEMMA
Monroe H. Freedman*
Lawyers are not undercover informants.
- Stephen Gillers I
I.

INTRODUCTION

The trilemma refers to three ethical obligations bearing on lawyerclient confidentiality, all of which a lawyer cannot simultaneously obey

when faced with client perjury. A lawyer is required (1) to learn as much
as possible about a client's case; 2 (2) to inform the client of the lawyer's
obligation to keep information confidential; 3 and (3) to reveal
confidential information4 to the court if the lawyer knows that the client

has committed perjury.

* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I am grateful
for comments by Susan Fortney, Sarah Izquierdo, and Abbe Smith, and for technical support from
Jessica A. Backman, Assistant Director of Information Technology Services, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University. All discrepancies in formatting are at the author's discretion.
1. Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting a Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at WK4
(quoting Professor Stephen Gillers).
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE § 4-4.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1986);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("Competent
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of
the problem ....
"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, introductory

note (1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
The renowned trial lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, said: "Any lawyer surprised by
facts at a trial has failed in the preparation. It's that simple." Accordingly, "I demand complete
candor and honesty from the client-no holding back." Priscilla Anne Schwab, Interview with
Edward Bennett Williams, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL: A PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 1178,

1180, 1182 (John G. Koeltl, ed., 2nd ed. 1989). In the same Primer publishing the statements by
Williams, Irving Younger wrote: "[N]othing [should] come as a surprise ....Everything must be
anticipated ....If a lawyer doesn't already know what the case is all about, he shouldn't be trying
it." Irving Younger, Cicero on Cross-Examination, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL: A PRIMER FOR
TRIAL LAWYERS, supra at 532-33, 535.
3. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a).
4. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)(3).
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My view is that the lawyer cannot give effective assistance of
counsel without knowing as much as possible about a client's case, that
clients will frequently withhold critical information from the lawyer
unless the lawyer promises confidentiality, and that the lawyer should
not then violate her promise of confidentiality if the client testifies
perjuriously.5 Accordingly, the obligation that must be sacrificed is
candor to the court regarding what the lawyer has learned from the client
in confidence.6 In my experience, this is the position of an
overwhelming number of criminal defense lawyers, and, as shown in
the next Part, it is the traditional position of the American Bar
Association ("ABA").7
Nevertheless, a prominent figure in lawyers' ethics, Professor
Stephen Gillers, took a contrary position in a 2006 article titled Monroe
Freedman's Solution to the Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma Is
Wrong as a Matter of Policy and ConstitutionalLaw.' However, Gillers
subsequently changed his mind in Guns, Fruits, Drugs, and Documents:
9
A CriminalDefense Lawyer's Responsibilityfor Real Evidence.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TRILEMMA

The trilemma has existed in the ABA's codifications of ethical rules
for lawyers since the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, and it has
continued through the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule(s)" or
"Rule(s)").' 0 Under each of these codifications, the ABA has resolved
the trilemma in favor of lawyer-client confidentiality over candor to
the court."
5. Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
Winter 2008, at 133, 138.
6. Id. at 137.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See generally Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman's Solution to the Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Trilemma is Wrong as a Matter of Policy and ConstitutionalLaw, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
821 (2006) [hereinafter Gillers, Freedman'sSolution].
9. See Stephen Gillers, Guns, Fruits, Drugs and Documents: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Responsibility for Real Evidence, 63 STAN. L. REv. 813, 822-24 (2011) [hereinafter Gillers, Real
Evidence]. In reversing his position, Professor Stephen Gillers has joined Judge Marvin Frankel and
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., also former critics of my view of lawyer-client confidentiality.
Some of the disagreements have focused particularly on the perjury trilemma, but the disagreements
have related more broadly to the importance of lawyer-client confidentiality. See MONROE
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS].

ETHICS

185-86

(4th ed., 2010)

10. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REv. 1091, 1107-08, 1144-50, 1147 n.286 (1985).
11. Id. at 1146 n.280, 1147-49; see UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at
185-86; Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected
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For example, in Formal Opinion 268 (1945), the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated: "While
ordinarily it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to disclose
to the court any fraud that he believes is being practiced on the court
[Canon 29], this duty does not transcend that to preserve the client's
confidences [Canon 37]. "12
Then, in Formal Opinion 287 (1953), the Committee held that
precisely because the lawyer is an officer of the court, she is bound by
the court's own rules for the administration of justice to maintain her
client's confidences, even in the face of a client's perjury. The ABA
Committee said:
"We yield to none in our insistence on the lawyer's loyalty to the
court of which he is an officer. Such loyalty does not, however, consist
merely in respect for the judicial office and candor and frankness to the
judge. It involves also the steadfast maintenance of the principles which
the courts themselves have evolved for the effective administration of
justice, one of the most firmly established of which is the preservation
undisclosed of the confidences communicated
by his clients to the
3
lawyer in his professional capacity.'
Similarly, under the Model Code, Formal Opinion 341 considered
an apparent requirement in the Code that a lawyer disclose client fraud
on the court or on third parties. 14 The Committee found such an
obligation to be "unthinkable," and dismissed the apparent requirement
of disclosure of client confidences as an oversight in drafting. 5 On the
basis of "tradition ...backed by substantial policy considerations," the
Committee reaffirmed
that confidentiality takes precedence over candor
16
court.
the
to
The Model Rules appeared to make a major change in that
traditional position, but to minimal effect. As held in Formal Opinion
87-353: "It must be emphasized that this opinion does not.., require the
lawyer now to judge, rather than represent, the client."' 7 In fact,
only in "the unusual case" will the lawyer be required to reveal a
client's perjury. 8

Privilege,41 DUKE L.J. 572, 595 (1991).
12. ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945); Subin, supra note
10 at 1147 n. 286.
13. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
14. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-383 (1987).
18. Id.
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The reason is that the lawyer's obligation to disclose client perjury
to the tribunal is "strictly limited" by Model Rule 3.3 to the situation
where the lawyer "knows" that the client has committed perjury.1 9 And
"know" and "knowledge" are defined in the Model Rules as requiring
"actual knowledge., 20 The situations where the lawyer knows will
2
ordinarily be based on "admissions the client has made to the lawyer.", 1
Moreover, as shown below, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are
violated if a lawyer elicits incriminating admissions from a client, and
then reveals those admissions to a court and/or the prosecution.22
In Nix v. Whiteside,23 the court-appointed defense counsel inferred
that his client intended to commit perjury and threatened to tell the trial
judge. 24 As a result, the defendant omitted the particular testimony and
the lawyer did not reveal any client confidences.25 Subsequently, the
client appealed his conviction, and the Supreme Court held that the
defense lawyer had not violated the Sixth Amendment when he
threatened to reveal his client's pejury.26
The decision in Nix v. Whiteside is sometimes misunderstood as
having settled all constitutional questions regarding a lawyer's
obligations relating to client perjury. In fact, Nix was limited to a single
important constitutional issue.2 7 Whiteside's unappealing contention was
that in dissuading the perjury, his lawyer had violated Whiteside's right
to effective assistance of counsel and prejudiced his case.28 The Court,
therefore, held only that when defense counsel dissuaded the part of
Whiteside's testimony that was perjurious by saying he would reveal it
to the court, the lawyer's conduct "fell within the wide range of
professional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable under the
29
Sixth Amendment.,
19. Id.
20. MODEL RULES R. 1.0(f); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)§ 120, cmt. C (1998).
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-383 (1987). Both the
Model Rules and the American Law Institute's Restatement Third of the Law Governing Lawyers
say that a lawyer's knowledge "may be inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES R. 1.0(f);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 120, cmt. C. However, the Restatement explains that such an inference
can be drawn only if the lawyer ignores what is "plainly apparent." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 120.
And what is "plainly apparent" does not include information that the lawyer could discover by
making a reasonable inquiry. Id. As a result, it is indeed "the unusual case" in which a lawyer would
feel compelled to reveal client perjury under Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
22. See infra Part IV.A.
23. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
24. Nixv. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 161 (1986).
25. Id.at 162.
26. Id. at 175-76.
27. Id. at 166.
28. Id.at 162, 173-74.
29. Id. at 166.
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The Court noted, however: "Robinson divulged no client
communications until he was compelled to do so in response to
Whiteside's post-trial challenge to the quality of his performance. We
see this as a case in which the attorney successfully dissuaded the client
from committing the crime of perjury. 3 °
Professors Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., and William Hodes have
emphasized that Robinson "merely threatened" to reveal Whiteside's
perjury, but "did not blow the whistle." 3' This critical factual
limitation of the Nix decision left the client perjury issue "murkier" than
even Chief Justice Burger's misstatements of law and fact in the
majority opinion.32
Moreover, within weeks of the decision in Nix, the ABA and the
American Law Institute produced a videotape in which several experts
criticized the idea that a criminal defense lawyer might be ethically
required to divulge his client's perjury.33 That notion was characterized
as "startling, unworkable, 34and out-of-touch with the dynamics of the
lawyer-client relationship.,

III. GILLERS'S CHANGE OF POSITION ON POLICY
A. Gillers's Two Articles on Lawyer-Client Confidentiality
Professor Gillers's initial disagreement with my analysis was
expressed in his Hofstra Law Review article, Monroe Freedman's
Solution to the Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma Is Wrong as a
Matter of Policy and ConstitutionalLaw.35 However, Gillers has since
30.

Id.
at 172.

31.

2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 29.19

(3d ed. 2014).
32. Id.The Chief Justice's conclusions, analysis, and use of authorities have been severely
criticized. Professor Norman Lefstein has observed that the majority opinion "contains a shocking
misstatement of the law pertaining to client perjury." Norman Lefstein, Reflections on the Client
Perjury Dilemma and Nix v. Whiteside, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1986 at 27, 28. Another critic of the
Chief Justice's inaccuracies is Brent Appel, the Iowa Deputy Attorney General who argued and won
Nix v. Whiteside. See Brent Appel, Nix v. Whiteside: The Role of Apples, Oranges, and the Great
Houdini in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 20-21 (1987); see also Monroe H.
Freedman, The Aftermath of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora'sBox, 23 CRIM. L.
BULL. 25, 26-27 (1987).
33. In addition, Brent Appel was quoted in the ABA Journal as saying that if the lawyer does
not "know for sure" that a witness's testimony is false, the lawyer should present the evidence to the
court. David 0. Stewart, Drawing the Line at Lying, 72 A.B.A. J. 84, 88 (1986). As long as the
client "never admits that [the story] is false," St. Louis attorney Robert Haar added, most lawyers
"suspend judgment and do the best they can." Any different standard of "knowing," he explained,
would be "at war with the duty to represent the client zealously." Stewart, supra.
34. See Freedman,supra note 5 at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. See generally Gillers, Freedman's Solution, supra note 8. Gillers was responding to my
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reversed the views he expressed in that article, and he has adopted the
same position on lawyer-client confidentiality as mine in a more recent
article.36 That is, on both policy and constitutional grounds, Gillers has
concluded that protecting the client's interests takes precedence over
disclosing client information.37
B. The Lawyer's Withholding Real Evidence Is the HarderCase
Gillers's subject in the more recent Stanford Law Review article is
the lawyer's possession of real evidence, such as the client's murder
weapon or an incriminating stolen item. 38 He writes: "[T]he casespossibly excepting white-collar cases-require the lawyer to deliver the
item to authorities even without subpoena and even if the item is
.... This is wrong both as a matter of policy
powerfully incriminating
39
and as a matter of law.",
True. But, arguably this situation is an even less compelling one
for the preservation of client confidentiality than the client perjury
situation. When a lawyer withholds a tangible item, the tribunal is not
merely being misled by false testimony; it is unaware of the very
existence of the evidence. In addition, in the case of client perjury, the
person who does the misleading is the client. 40 But, when the lawyer
withholds a murder weapon or other incriminating item, the lawyer is the
person who "conceal[s] a document or other material having a potential
evidentiary value."' ' Moreover, the client who testifies falsely is subject
to cross-examination and rebuttal, whereas the court never hears a
challenge to the lawyer's suppression of the weapon or stolen item.42
The case of real evidence, therefore, is arguably the more difficult one in
which to maintain that lawyer-client confidentiality takes precedence
over candor to the court.
position as expressed in the third edition of Understanding Lawyers' Ethics, published in 2004.
With some updating, that is substantially the same as my position in the fourth edition, published in
2010, so my references here will be to the fourth edition. See generally UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHIcS, supranote 9.

36. See Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9, at 850-51.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 822-23.
39. Id. at 860.
40. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)-(b).
41. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(a). A lawyer who conceals real evidence might also be prosecuted
for obstruction of justice. Gillers contends that "concealment" is a "legal conclusion" and does not
"fit[] well." Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9 at 830. Even if characterized as concealment, he
argues, the lawyer's retention of the weapon is "not 'with the intent to impair the
object's... availability for use in an official proceeding."' Id. Rather, the intent may only be "to
avoid making the legitimate use of counsel costly to the client." Id.
42.

MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/3
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C. DiscriminatoryUse ofModel Rule 3.3 Against Indigent Defendants
There is a preliminary but critical policy issue that Gillers does not
deal with in either of his articles. Gillers's first article is based on a talk
he gave at a Hofstra Law School ethics conference.43 Prior to the
conference, I asked him to address the fact that virtually all of the cases
in which lawyers reveal client perjury involve court-appointed lawyers
representing indigents, who are disproportionately non-white, thereby
producing a de facto violation of equal protection."
The issue is important because poor people should receive no less
effective representation than those who can pay for a lawyer.45 It is
discriminatory, and it is a denial of equal access to justice for indigent
clients to receive a lower level of confidentiality, causing them to further
mistrust court-appointed lawyers, communicate less, and thereby receive
less effective representation.
When Gillers failed to mention this issue in his talk at the
conference, I raised it with him in the question period. Here is his
answer from the conference transcript:
"So now we got a little too complicated, because we forced
the lawyers to look at the rules. All right. Well, then there arethat would be part of the record and, you know, it depends-upon
the conversation. A6
Nor did Gillers choose to replace that incoherent response when he
was given the opportunity to edit the transcript, or to address the issue in
the text of his subsequently published article.47
In an online Legal Ethics Forum, Gillers claimed that he had
answered the policy question in response to a question at the conference
from Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky.48 However, his answer to
Yaroshefsky was speculative and, at best, only partly responsive to the
issue of de facto discrimination against clients of court-appointed
lawyers. Gillers said, "One never knows, but in the event of a more
flexible policy, the opportunity, the license, if you will, to do what
cannot now be done by way of anticipatory perjury, might result in more
than now exists; i.e., empirically perhaps the criminal defense lawyer
43. Gillers, Freedman'sSolution, supra note 8, at 821 n.1.
44. See UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at 184; Freedman, supranote 5, at
148-49.
45. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
46. Gillers, Freedman's Solution, supra note 8, at 843.
47. Monroe Freedman, The CriminalDefense Lawyer's Trilemma, LEGAL ETHICS F. (Oct. 11,
2009, 12:43 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2009/10/the-criminal-defense-lawyerstrilemma.htmi.
48. Id.
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today urges the client not to get on the stand and lie, cognizant of Rule
3.3. If Rule 3.3 were not there, and lawyers were not at risk, they might
see that as another legitimate tactic in the defense of a criminal
accusation. They might not be as49scrupulous or careful as you suggested
they are in the Rule 3.3 regime.,
Gillers's unsupported suggestion is that, because of Rule 3.3,
clients might be persuaded by their lawyers to refrain from perjury. But,
that doesn't explain why only lawyers representing indigent clients are
revealing client perjury, unless the unexpressed and questionable
assumption is that only fee-paying clients can be dissuaded from perjury.
In fact, unlike indigent clients, fee-paying clients are able to discharge
any lawyers who threaten to reveal their perjury, and can hire more
accommodating counsel.5
D. Imposing a Cost on Informed LegalAdvice
My major concern is that requiring lawyers to reveal confidential
information to state authorities will cause clients to withhold critical
information from their lawyers. 5 ' Such a disclosure requirement imposes
a cost on the client's right to fully informed legal advice. As the
Supreme Court held in Fisher v. United States:12 "As a practical matter,
if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be
obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the
absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his
53
lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.
Gillers originally dismissed this concern, saying that he did not
believe that requiring lawyers to reveal confidences would dissuade
clients from being candid with their lawyers.54 In the Stanford Law
Review article, however, Gillers refers to the importance of providing the
client with "fully informed legal advice" 55 and quotes Fisher with
approval.56 For this reason, he says, a state should not be able to force a
lawyer to produce a weapon "at risk of discipline and prosecution., 57 If
the lawyer needs to examine or test the murder weapon in order to
49. Gillers, Freedman'sSolution, supranote 8, at 845.
50. Id.
51.

UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supranote 9, at 121, 155-56, 161.

52. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
53.

UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at 136 (quoting Fisher v. United

States, 425 U.S. 391, 403); see also UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at 128-29,
152-53, 154-57.
54. Gillers, Freedman'sSolution, supranote 8,at 826.
55. See Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9, at 829.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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represent the client, that threat may discourage the lawyer from
accepting the weapon, thereby undermining the client's interest in the
advice of counsel. 58 Moreover, "even when no such examination is
needed, the threat discourages the lawyer from taking possession of a
dangerous or stolen item." 59

lV.

GILLERS'S CHANGE OF POSITION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY

A.

A Summary of My Position

My position regarding the constitutional protection of lawyer-client
confidentiality is based on the relationship between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Providing advice to a client about his Fifth Amendment
rights is an essential part of a defense lawyer's job in providing effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 60 The reason is that
"[a] layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and
boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege," and the assertion of that
right, therefore, "often depends upon legal advice from someone who is
trained and skilled in the subject matter.",61 Thus, the Fifth Amendment,
coupled with the Sixth Amendment, protects the accused
from being
62
conviction.,
own
his
of
instrument
deluded
"the
made
The constitutional issue arises in the case of client perjury because
the lawyer is ethically required to impress upon the client "the
imperative need [that the lawyer] know all aspects of the case. 63 The
client is "thereby encouraged ...to communicate fully and64frankly with
the lawyer even as to... legally damaging subject matter."'
Moreover, before eliciting incriminating information from the
client, the lawyer is discouraged from warning the client that, if the
client should testify falsely, the lawyer will reveal the client's
58. Id.
59. Id.at 854.
60. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964) (citing Note and Comments, An
Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000,
1048-51 (1964)) ("Our Constitution... strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be
advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination.").
61. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981).
62. Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 325 (1999) (stating that the defendant should not be enlisted as "an instrument in his or her
own condemnation"); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (quoting 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF TIlE
CROWN ch. 46, § 34 (8th ed., 1824)) ("[T]he law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded
instrument of his own conviction."); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897).
63. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRM. JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION 4-3.2
(1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
64. MODEL RULES R. 1.6 cmt.
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confidences during the trial. 65 As the ABA has said, a defense lawyer
should not "intimate to the client in any way" that the client should
withhold information, "so as to afford defense counsel free rein to take
66
action which would be precluded by counsel's knowing of such facts.,
Model Rule 3.3 violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because it
requires the lawyer, first, to elicit her client's incriminating confidences
without giving the client any warning or Fifth Amendment advice, 67 and
second, on pain of professional discipline, to become an agent of the
state by disclosing at trial the confidences that she has elicited.68
The relevant cases begin with Massiah v. United States.69 Massiah
was indicted and released on bail. 70 His co-defendant and friend, Colson,
agreed to cooperate with the government.7 1 Colson allowed an agent to
install a transmitter in his car and, then, had a lengthy conversation with
Massiah while the agent listened in.72 In the course of that conversation,
Massiah made several incriminating statements that were used against
him at trial.73 The Supreme Court held that Massiah's self-incriminating
statements had to be suppressed because they had been "deliberately
elicited by the police after the defendant had been indicted and,
therefore, at a time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's help. 74
The Court went on to hold that the Constitution must protect a
defendant's right to counsel in that extrajudicial setting, because

65. ABA STANDARDS 4-3.2(b); MODEL RULES R. 1.4(a)(5) (requiring the lawyer to consult
with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct, but only after the lawyer
"knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law").

66. ABA STANDARDS 4-3.2(b). The purpose of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
Prosecution and Defense Function ("Standard(s)"), is to elaborate on the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct by providing a "consensus view of all segments of the criminal justice
community about what good, professional practice is and should be." Id. at xiv. Thus, Standard 43.2 is an elaboration on Model Rule 1.1 ("Competence") and Model Rule 1.6 ("Confidentiality of
Information").
67. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)(3); see Gillers, Freedman's Solution, supra note 8, at 828 n.32,
832-33 (2006).
68. Id. For a fuller discussion of these matters, see UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS,
supranote 9, at 167-69.
69. 377 U.S. 204 (1964).
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 203.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
Spano involved a confession in a state court. 360 U.S. at 315. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court, requiring exclusion of the confession as involuntary, was based on the totality of the

circumstances under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 323. Although
Massiah was a federal prosecution, the holding applies, as well, to state prosecutions. 377 U.S. at
205-06; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,400 (1977).
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otherwise the defendant might be denied "effective representation7 5by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."
Accordingly, Massiah's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were
jointly violated "when there was used against him at his trial evidence of
his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence
of his counsel. 76
Moreover, the fact that the damaging testimony was not elicited
from Massiah in a police station, but when he was free on bail, meant
that Massiah was "more seriously imposed upon.., because he did not
even know that he was under interrogation by a government agent. 77
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that someone who is trusted by
the defendant--epitomized by one's own lawyer-creates a more
serious constitutional problem than a known agent of one's adversary.78
This does not mean, of course, that a defendant has a "right to lie"
with impunity. One very real consequence is that the defendant's
sentence can be enhanced if the judge concludes that he has lied under
oath at trial. 79 A defendant who does this can also be prosecuted for
perjury. 80 "However, one of the penalties for perjury is not a waiver of
the defendant's [constitutional] right to be warned by his lawyer of the
consequences before he unwittingly makes incriminating statements to
his lawyer.'' 8 1 Such a waiver of a constitutional right can be
accomplished only by an intentional relinquishment of a known right,82
which is not possible when the defendant is unaware of the
consequences at the time he incriminates himself.
Nor is denial of the right to counsel in presenting his testimony a
penalty for a defendant's perjury.83 In New Jersey v. Portash,84
defendant Portash had been granted use immunity for earlier grand jury
75. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398; Spano, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
77. Id. (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (Hays, J., dissenting)).
78. See UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 9, at 174-79 (discussing West v.
Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 52 (1988); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980)).
79. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
80. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1980).
81. UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supranote 9, at 180.
82. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there
has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused." Id.
83. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170 n.6 (1986) (noting the repudiation of the narrative
method).
84. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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testimony." When he was subsequently prosecuted based on other
evidence, the trial court ruled in limine that if Portash testified to an alibi
that contradicted his grand jury testimony, the prosecution would be able
to use the grand jury testimony to impeach him.86 Accordingly, Portash
did not testify at his trial.87
On appeal, it was assumed that Portash's immunized grand jury
testimony had been truthful and that his trial testimony would have been
perjurious. 88 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that Portash had a
constitutional right to present his alibi without being impeached with his
grand jury testimony. 89 Portash's conviction was therefore reversed by
the Supreme Court in order to allow him to present the alibi on retrial. 90
Moreover, there was no suggestion that Portash's lawyer had acted
improperly in attempting to present the perjurious alibi; on the contrary,
the appeal could not even have been taken if the lawyer had not assisted
Portash in that effort, and the case was sent back so that he could do so
again at the retrial. 91
B.

Gillers's Current ConstitutionalPosition

In his earlier Hofstra Law Review article, Gillers rejected my view
that revealing client perjury violates a client's rights under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 92 "[C]onstitutional jurisprudence does not
support the argument Freedman makes," Gillers wrote. He further
argued, "Requiring a defense lawyer to remedy client perjury, even
through the use or revelation of confidential information, violates no
constitutional rights of the accused ....
However, in the more recent Stanford Law Review article, Gillers
argues that "forcing a lawyer on pain of prosecution or discipline to
produce incriminating evidence in her possession can ...undermine"

85.
86.

Id.at 451-52.
Id.
at 452.

87.

Id.

88. See id. at 452-53.
89. Id.
at 459-60.
90. Id.
at 453, 459-60.
91. The decision in Portashwas based on the Fifth Amendment alone. Id.at 461. The case is
that much stronger when the incriminating evidence has been obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, as well-that is, when the incriminating evidence has been deliberately elicited from
the defendant by his own lawyer, acting as an agent of the State, who has been forbidden to warn
him in advance of the consequences.
92. Gillers, Freedman'sSolution, supranote 8, at 831.
93. Id.
at 833.
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the client's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 94 "What difference
should it make whether the State's compulsion of the lawyer is through
subpoena and threat of contempt," he asks, "or through the threat of
prosecution and disbarment of a recalcitrant unsubpoenaed lawyer who
fails to make delivery on her own motion?"9 5 He answers that question:
"If the lawyer's source was her client, the [client's] Fifth Amendment
interest... may be equally compromised whichever the threat." 96
Gillers recognizes that if a lawyer's only motivation for taking
possession of an object is to make it more difficult for the State to find it
in a location where it has probative value or find it all, the lawyer's
conduct is unethical and possibly illegal.97 However, if a lawyer is
permitted or encouraged to take possession of an item to prevent its
destruction or alteration, to preserve stolen property, or to protect the
public, the lawyer cannot then be required to give the item to the
authorities if doing so would harm her client. 98 So far, so good.
Gillers goes on, however, to support an investigative procedure and
a registry requirement to avoid a lawyer's retention of incriminating
information. 99 In brief, the lawyer would be required to record her
representation of a client in a new registry when her representation of the
client is not known to the State.100 The lawyer would also be required to
provide the identity of the source of the item if it is not the client.10 '
There are serious problems with a registry requirement, which has
not been adopted anywhere since Professor Kevin R. Reitz first
proposed it more than two decades ago. 0 2 If it were ever seriously
considered, criminal defense lawyers, and probably the ABA, wouldfor good reasons-likely oppose the idea. If the proposal were enacted,
clients would be discouraged from turning over possibly incriminating
information to their lawyers, giving up the right to receive fullyinformed legal advice. In addition, if a lawyer were to reveal to the
State that she represented a client in a potential criminal matter she
94. Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9, at 853.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 853 nn.217-18 (citing Hubbell v. United States, 530 U.S. 27, 42, 45-46 (2000);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). Gillers adds that "a lawyer may take possession
of, and retain an item indefinitely: (1) [iun order to avoid danger to others; (2) [w]hen the item is the
lawful property of another and immediate return is not possible without incriminating the client; (3)
[i]f the item has exculpatory value; and (4) when return is impossible." Gillers, Real Evidence,
supranote 9, at 857.
97. Gillers, Real Evidence, supranote 9, at 854.
98. Id. at 856-60.
99. The proposal was first made by Reitz, supranote 11, at 651.
100. Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9, at 862.
101. Id.
102. Reitz, supranote 11, at 587 n.64.
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would incriminate
the client in violation of the Fifth Amendment and/or
03
other law.'
V.

CONCLUSION

My principal policy concern with requiring a lawyer to reveal a
client's confidences to remedy perjury is that such a requirement would
discourage clients from confiding in their lawyers and, thereby,
obtaining informed legal advice. In his earlier Hofstra Law Review
article, Professor Gillers dismissed this concern because he did not
believe that requiring lawyers to reveal confidences would dissuade
clients from being candid with them.'04 In his later Stanford Law Review
article, however, Gillers embraces the importance of lawyers providing
clients with fully informed legal advice.'0 5 For this reason, he says, a
state should not be able to force a lawyer to produce a weapon or stolen
item, even after the lawyer has examined it or has decided that she has
no need to do so. 10 6 Gillers worries that, otherwise, full communication
between lawyer and client would be impaired.
I welcome Professor Gillers's change of heart on the importance of
lawyer-client confidentiality even at the cost of "candor." While he
should go further and recognize that his acceptance of the registry
solution to the problem of tangible evidence is an unsatisfactory halfloaf, it is both significant and commendable that Professor Gillers now
accepts that lawyers should not be "undercover informants,"'1 7 turning
on their own clients.
According to Professor Gillers's most recent thinking, Monroe
Freedman's solution to the criminal defense lawyer's trilemma is right
as a matter of policy and constitutional law.

103. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Chemey, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990).
Attorney David Chemey was subpoenaed by the Grand Jury to reveal the name of the individual
who paid legal fees for a known individual that Cherney was defending in a narcotics conspiracy
trial. Id. Cherney refused to reveal the fee payer's identity, asserting that it constituted a confidential
communication which was privileged because the payer was also allegedly involved in the drug
operation and had consulted the attorney for legal advice in connection with that involvement. Id.
The Seventh Circuit agreed: "In the situation at bar, the fee payer sought legal advice concerning his
involvement in the drug conspiracy. Disclosure of the fee payer's identity would necessarily reveal
the client's involvement in that crime and thus reveal his motive for seeking legal advice in the first
place.... In effect, therefore, disclosure of the client's identity would expose the substance of a
confidential communication between the attorney and the client." Id. at 568.
104. Gillers, Freedman'sSolution, supranote 8, at 832-34.
105. Gillers, Real Evidence, supra note 9, at 829.
106. Id.at 855.
107. Adam Liptak, supra note 1, at WK4.
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